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SAFETY DETERMINATIONS IN NUCLEAR POWER LICENSING:
A CRITICAL VIEW
Harold P. Green*
I. Introduction
At the end of 1967, there were 16 privately-owned nuclear power plants
in existence in the United States. An additional 21 were under construction,
another 40 were on order, and 12 were planned but not yet ordered.' It is
estimated that by 1980 nuclear reactors will be producing more than 30 percent
of the nation's total electrical output and that by the year 2000 this will increase
2
to at least 50 percent.
There are compelling reasons for this trend to nuclear power. The supply
of fossil fuels on which our present industrial economy is based is dwindling
fast.' Utilities are now prepared to assume that investment in nuclear power is
economically feasible and competitive as compared with conventionally-fueled
power plants. Nuclear power plants, moreover, are regarded as "clean" in the
sense that they do not pour large quantities of smoke and fumes into the atmosphere.
Nuclear power plants, however, give rise to other hazards of a dimension
previously unknown in our society. Their normal operation necessitates the use
of, and results in the creation of, radiation and radioactive materials that, unless
carefully controlled and confined, can cause physical and genetic injury to the
public. A major accident in a nuclear power plant could result in a public
catastrophe dwarfing any previously experienced. In 1957, in connection with
congressional consideration of the legislation leading to the Price-Anderson
Act," the Atomic Energy Commission commissioned Brookhaven National Laboratory to undertake a study of The Theoretical Possibilitiesand Consequences of
Major Accidents in Large Nuclear Power Plants.This study concluded that under
quite pessimistic assumptions a single major accident might result in: (1) 3,400
deaths at distances up to 15 miles and 43,000 injuries at distances up to 45
miles, (2) property damage of as much as 7 billion dollars, and (3) land contamination at even greater distances.' At the same time, the study estimated
that the possibility of such a major accident was extremely remote. Eight years
later, when a ten-year extension of the Price-Anderson Act was under considera* A.B., University of Chicago, 1942; J.D., University of Chicago Law School, 1948;
Professor of Law and Director of the Law, Science, and Technology Program, The George
Washington University National Law Center. Professor Green is the author of numerous
articles on atomic energy and government security programs.
1 Atomic Energy Comm'n, Press Release No. IN-848, Jan. 11, 1968. See also AEC, THE
NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 1967, at 78-79.

2 Id.

3

Assuming the validity of this proposition, there are undoubtedly alternatives to nuclear

power to assure adequate electricity in the 21st century. None of these alternatives, however,
has the support, as does nuclear power, of powerful governmental bodies with vested interests.
4 71 Stat. 516 (1957).
5 AEC, WASH-740 (1957). The AEC's Acting Chairman summarized the conclusions
of this study in a letter to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th
Cong., Ist Sess. 31-34 (1957).
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tion, the AEC commissioned another similar study to update the 1957 information. Although the results of this study have not been published, the ABC
Chairman has publicly stated that it indicates an even more remote possibility
of such an accident, but a somewhat increased potential for damage, primarily
because of the larger nuclear power plants now being constructed.'

II. The Regulatory Scheme
The assumption that the possibility of a major reactor accident is exceedingly remote rests primarily on the fact that the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and
AEC regulations require elaborate and comprehensive procedures to assure
that all reactors are designed, constructed, and operated in a manner that will
make them as safe as possible.' To ensure safety those procedures require a
variety of redundant fail-safe devices to reduce the possibility of an accident, a
building housing the reactor that will effectively contain any radioactivity that
may be released in the event of an accident, and the location of nuclear power
plants at a healthy distance from populated areas?
Under the original Atomic Energy Act of 1946,1" most atomic energy
activities were reserved as a government monopoly, and private persons were
prohibited from building, owning, or operating reactors. Under that legislation,
responsibility for development of nuclear power rested with the AEC, and development and construction of prototype power reactors were carried out at
the AEC's geographically isolated facilities under conditions making cornercutting to save costs unnecessary.
The 1954 Act" opened the field of nuclear power to private enterprise, in
large part to speed the development of nuclear power by bringing to bear the
cost-cutting and other incentives of competitive free enterprise." The AEC did
not, however, withdraw from the field of nuclear power development. It has
been and is the policy of the AEC, supported by congressional action, to expend
government funds to develop power reactor concepts to the point at which
private industry is willing to assume the financial risk on its own. To this end,
the AEC has built and operated prototype reactors in its own facilities and has
provided substantial research and development assistance and money for use
in private power reactor projects."
6 "Hearings on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation Before the Subcomm.
on Legislation of the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 347-48 (1965).
The study on which these conclusions were based has evidently been suppressed, presumably
to avoid alarming the public.
7 Only those aspects of the regulatory scheme directly related to safety are considered
in this article. For a description of the regulatory scheme circa 1958, see Green, The Law of
Reactor Safety, 12 VAND. L. REv. 115 (1958).
8 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as 1954 Act]. The AEC's regulations relating to reactor safety requirements are set forth
in 10 C.F.R. Part 50 (1968); 3 COH AT. EN. L. REP.
14,643, at 20,459 (1967).
9 The reactor site criteria are set forth in 10 C.F.R. Part 100 (1968); 3 CCH AT. EN.
L. RaP. T 14,991, at 20,715 (1962). They are "criteria" to "guide" the AEC and are not
regarded as regulatory requirements.
10 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
11 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-96 (1964).
12 H.R. REP. No. 2181, 83d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1954).
13 See Green, The Strange Case of Nuclear Power, 17 FFD. B.J. 100 (1957).
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While government policy encourages development of nuclear power, it
also seeks to assure that nuclear power plants will not endanger the health and
safety of the public. The congressional concern about public health and safety
was clearly reflected in the 1954 Act, which contained no less than twenty-five
references to "the health and safety of the public" and elaborate licensing and
regulatory provisions." 4
The 1954 Act created a two-step licensing process. A utility desiring to
establish a nuclear power plant must file an application for a license with the
AEC. The application must include detailed information about the proposed
facility and its characteristics sufficient to enable the ABC to find that the
activity "will provide adequate protection to the health and safety of the public." 5 If the application is acceptable to the AEC, the applicant will be "initially
granted a construction permit" authorizing construction of the facility.1 6 Upon
completion of construction in accordance with the construction permit, the
applicant files amendments to his license application to bring it up to date.
Thereupon, a license to operate the facility will be issued if the AEC finds that
the facility has been constructed and will operate in accordance with the application, the provisions of the 1954 Act, and the AEC regulations."
It should be noted that the 1954 Act is quite vague as to any affirmative
standards for issuance of construction permits and operating licenses. Subsection
2232 (a) states that the ABC must find that the activity will "provide adequate
protection to the health and safety of the public"; 8 subsections 2133(d) and
2134(b) provide that no license, and by implication no construction permit, 9
shall be issued if, in the opinion of the AEC, the issuance "would be inimical...
to the health and safety of the public."20 It is clear, therefore, since all power
reactors involve some risk to the health and safety of the public, that it was the
intention of the Congress to leave to the judgment of the AEC the specific degree
of such risk that would be acceptable.
We turn then to the ABC's regulations to seek additional clarification, but
unfortunately, we find that little light is shed. The regulations specify that the
AEC, in determining whether a license should be issued, "will be guided"'" by
the following considerations insofar as relevant to the safety determination:
(1) The processes to be performed, the operating procedures, the facility and
equipment, the use of the facility, and other technical specifications or proposals
"provide reasonable assurance" that the applicant will comply with AEC
regulations and that "the health and safety of the public will not be en14 42 U.S.C.
official summary
239-48.
15 42 U.S.C.
16 42 U.S.C.
17 Id.

§§ 2131-40 (licensing procedure), 2231-41 (judicial review). For a brief
of the AEC's reactor licensing procedures, see Hearings, supra note 6, at
§ 2232 (1964).
§ 2235 (1964).

18

42 U.S.C. § 2232(a) (1964).

19

Section 2235 provides that "for all other purposes of the Act, a construction permit

21

10 C.F.R. § 50.40 (1968).

is deemed to be a 'license.'" 42 U.S.C. § 2235 (1964).
20 42 U.S.C. §§ 2133(d), 2134(d) (1964). These provisions are those relevant to
the licensing of power reactors. There are other provisions relating to licensing of other types
of nuclear reactors. 42 U.S.C. § 2133, 2134 (1964).
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dangered." 22 (2) The issuance of the license will not, in the opinion of the ABC,
"be inimical... to the health and safety of the public." 28 A construction permit
will be granted if the application is "in conformity with and acceptable under"
the criteria applicable to licenses."'
The ABC's regulations also introduce the concept of the "provisional construction permit." 5 This concept recognizes that nuclear technology is still in
its developmental phase with improvements occurring at a very rapid pace.
A utility seeking to construct a nuclear power plant that it needs to have on
the line by a particular date to meet anticipated demand usually, at this stage
of technological development, desires to conduct research and development
looking towards incorporation in the final design of the very latest and best
technological advances. Accordingly, research and development take place
simultaneously with construction of the plant, with the results to be incorporated
into individual components of the plant. The provisional construction permit
enables the utility to proceed in this manner. It will be issued when the AEC
finds that: (1) the application describes the proposed facility in terms of its
principal architectural and design criteria and safety features; (2) further information necessary to complete the AEC's safety analysis will be supplied at
a later date; (3) the applicant has identified safety features requiring further
research and development and will conduct a research and development program to resolve outstanding safety questions; and (4) there is "reasonable assurance" that the outstanding safety questions will be resolved by the date specified
in the application for completion of construction, and the "proposed facility can
be constructed and operated at the proposed location without undue risk to
the health and safety of the public. '2 6 As a practical matter, however, a provisional construction permit, rather than the statutory permit, is issued in every
case. The provisional permit authorizes the applicant to proceed with construcion, but does not constitute AEC approval of any design feature or specification
unless such approval is specifically incorporated in the permit at the request of
the applicant." Thus, theoretically at least, the provisional permittee proceeds at
his risk since there is less assurance that an operating license will be issued than
in the case of the ordinary statutory permit. In neither case, however, is issuance
of the operating license automatic.
It is apparent, therefore, that the ABC's regulations do little more than
repeat the statutory language as to the affirmative safety standards for issuance
of a construction permit. Viewing the statutory and regulatory language together
we know only that a license or construction permit will not be issued if the
issuance would in the opinion of the AEC be "inimical... to the health and
safety of the public, ' 28 and that it will be issued if the Commission finds "reasonable assurance that the health and safety of the public will not be en22

10 C.F.R. § 50.40(a) (1968).

23
24
25
26
27

10 O.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
10 C.F.R.
Id.
10 C.F.R.

28

10 C.F.R. § 50.40(c)

§ 50.40(c) (1968).
§ 50.45 (1968).
§ 50.35 (1968).
§ 50.35(b) (1968).
(1968)

(emphasis added).
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dangered,"" or in the case of a provisional construction permit, "reasonable
assurance"
that there will be no "undue risk to the health and safety of the
30
public."
III. Licensing Procedures
The 1954 Act, as originally enacted, required the AEC to grant a hearing
in any licensing proceeding at the request "of any person whose interest may
be affected,"" but in the absence of such intervention there was no requirement
for a hearing. Two years after the 1954 Act became law, the AEC issued a
provisional construction permit, without prior hearing and without public dissemination of information on safety aspects, to Power Reactor Development
Company [PRDC] for construction of a fast breeder power reactor midway
between Detroit and Toledo. 2 The permit was issued in spite of the AEC's
failure to find, as then required in its own regulations, "reasonable assurance
that... [a reactor of the general type proposed] can be constructed and operated
at the proposed location without undue risk to the health and safety of the
public."3 Indeed, the construction permit recited on its face that there were
"uncertainties" with respect to the hazards of this type of reactor and that considerable theoretical and experimental work remained to be done before it could
be concluded that a reactor of the type proposed could be safely operated at
the proposed site. 4 The AEC's action prompted intervention by three labor
unions leading to an extended hearing before the Commission. Although the
intervenors demanded suspension of the permit pending resolution of the proceeding, the AEC refused to suspend the permit and construction went forward
as the hearing took place. The PRDC project was, incidentally, the beneficiary
of substantial governmental financial support under a contract with the AEG
which recited that the parties would carry out the agreement "in a spirit of
partnership and friendly cooperation with a maximum of effort and common
sense in achieving their common objective."3 5 On May 29, 1959, more than
two and a half years after the unions intervened, the AEC rendered its final
decision in the case reaffirming the issuance of the permit. Two of the Commission's findings were that the fast breeder reactor "is one of the promising
types for the development of electric power on a commercially feasible basis"3 "
and that PRDC would save "several years" in placing the reactor in operation
"by proceeding with construction and further research and development simultaneously, rather than awaiting complete research and development results."3 "
Nevertheless, the Commission was still unable to make the finding that there
29 10 C.F.R. § 50.40(a) (1968) (emphasis added).
30 10 C.F.R. § 50.35(c) (1968) (emphasis added).
31 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1964).
32 The technical and legal history of this case to April, 1966 is set forth, with principal
documents, in Hearings on Enrico Fermi Reactor: Use for IrradiationTesting and Background
Information Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965). There

have been subsequent developments of significance. See text at note 112 infra.
33
34

10 C.F.R. § 50.35 (Supp. 1958).
Hearings, supra note 32, at 84-85.

35 Id. at 66.
36 Id. at 130. (Finding 26.)
37 Id. (Finding 27).
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was reasonable assurance that the reactor could be safely operated when construction was completed. Instead, it was found that there was reasonable
assurance that theoretical and experimental investigations then underway, together with operating experience of two AEC-owned reactors and a British
reactor of the same general type, would enable the AEC to determine prior to
completion of construction whether or not the reactor could be operated safely,
and that there was "reasonable assurance that evidence will establish" that the
reactor could be safely operated. 8
The unions thereupon sought judicial review in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. That court found the "possibilities of
harm.., so enormous that any doubt as to what findings the [Atomic Energy]
Act requires,... should be resolved on the side of safety."39 It found the AEC's
safety findings deficient in two respects. First, it found that the AEC's "predictions regarding the future course of scientific development" did not satisfy the
requirements of the Act.!' In response to the ABC's contention that operation
of the reactor would not be licensed unless the predictions became reality, the
court pointed out that "[t]he economy cannot afford to invest enormous sums in
the construction of an atomic reactor that will not be operated" and that the
investment of such enormous sums would result in pressures to operate that "will
be great and may be irresistible."4' 1 Second, the court inferred from the congressional concern for safety an intention that "no reactor should, without compelling reasons, be located where it will expose so large a population to the
possibility of a nuclear disaster," and it saw no AEC findings of "compelling
42
reasons."
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 1954 Act's
two-step licensing procedure permitted the AEC to defer a definitive safety finding until operation is licensed. Further, it found nothing in the statute to support
the Court of Appeals' "compelling reasons" position. It declined, moreover, to
accept the premise that the AEC might yield to pressures due to PRDC's large
investment and license the operation of an unsafe reactor."3
Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented. They read the 1951
Act as requiring that the finding of safety be made when the construction permit
is issued or not at all. When construction is completed "momentum is on the
side of the applicant, not on the side of the public," not only by the desire to
salvage an investment, but also because "no agency wants to be the architect
of a 'white elephant.'"" To Justices Douglas and Black, the AEC's construction of the 1954 Act, which was approved by the majority of the Court, was a
"lighthearted approach to the most awesome, the most deadly, the most dangerous process that man has ever conceived."4 5
The PRDC controversy was not confined to the administrative and judicial
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. at 129 (Finding 18) (emphasis added).
International Union v. United States, 280 F.2d 645, 649 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
Id. at 650.
Id.
Id., at 651-52.
Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396 (1961).
Id., at 417 (dissenting opinion).
Id., at 419 (dissenting opinion).
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arenas. The Democratic-controlled Joint Committee on Atomic Energy [JCAE],
engaged in a fierce struggle with the Eisenhower Administration on the question
whether reliance should be placed on private enterprise to develop nuclear power
or whether the AEG itself should build and operate prototype nuclear power
plants, strongly opposed the AEG's issuance of the construction permit. To
provide assurance against similar actions in the future, the JCAE secured legislation, as part of the Price-Anderson Act,4 6 amending the Atomic Energy Act
in two major respects. Section 2232 was amended to provide for a mandatory
hearing on every application for a license for a power reactor. In addition,
the AEC's Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards [AGRS] was elevated
to statutory status, and its consideration of each application was made a part of
the statutory licensing scheme. 8 Not only was the ACRS now required to
review every application for a power reactor license, but it was also required
to submit a report thereon which would become part of the public record of
the proceeding.49
With the enactment of these amendments, the procedural and substantive
aspects of reactor licensing became inextricably intertwined. The AEG interpreted the requirement for a mandatory hearing and ACRS review on every
license application to require a hearing and ACRS consideration at the construction permit stage, the operating license stage, and on any significant amendment to the application at either stage. This led to a multitude of hearings,
most of which were uncontested. Except in the few cases involving outside intervenors, the hearings were conducted in a pro forma manner with the only
parties being the applicant and the AEC regulatory staff.5 In view of the
practice of informal discussion and collaboration between the regulatory staff
and the applicant,52 safety issues were generally resolved before the hearing so
46 71 Stat. 576-79 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1964).
47 71 Stat. 579 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2232 (1964).
48 The ACRS, by terms of the statutory amendment, consists of a maximum of 15
members appointed by the Commission for terms of four years each. 42 U.S.C. § 2039 (1964).
The ACRS was organized in 1953 through the merger of the AEC's Reactor Safeguards
Committee and its Industrial Committee on Reactor Location Problems. The Reactor Safeguards Committee was established in 1947 to review safety studies made by AEC contractors
on proposed reactors. 11 AEC SEMIANNUAL REP. 143 (1952).

The Industrial Committee on

Reactor Location Problems was subsequently created to "balance the technical and safety
aspects of reactor hazards as determined by the Reactor Safeguards Committee against non-

technical aspects giving consideration to such matters as the social and economic impact on
adjacent communities." 12 AEC SEMIANNUAL REP. 7 (1952). Both committees, and the
ACRS until enactment of the 1954 Act, dealt solely with ABC-owned reactors. The ACRS
came to be regarded as the most conservative, powerful, and influential group in connection
with matters of reactor safety. For a brief description of the current status and role of the
ACRS, see Hearings, supra note 6, at 248-52.
49 71 Stat. 579 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2232(b) (1964). Even before this
amendment, the AEC referred every license application to the ACRS for its consideration
and report. The ACRS reports to the Commission were, however, regarded as administratively
confidential.
50 STAFF
COMMENTS

OF
ON

JOINT COMM.
IMPROVING

1961).

87th Cong., 1st Sess., VIEws AND
REGULATORY PROCESS 151-55 (Joint Comm. Print
HYDEMAN, THE ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION AND REGU-

THE

ON

ATOMIC ENERGY,

AEC

See also BERMAN AND
NUCLEAR FACILITIES 133-34 (1961).
51 BERMAN AND HYDEMAN, supra note 50, at 122-23.
52 Hearings on Licensing and Regulation of Nuclear Reactors Before the Joint Comim
on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1967). The AEC has offered to conduct informal reviews of reactor safety problems even before the application for a construction permit
LATING

is filed. 2 CCH

AT. EN.

L. REP. 13,564 (1966).
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that the role of both parties typically was to build a record supporting issuance
of the construction permit, license, or amendment. The entire multi-hearing
procedure not only invited intervention, but also was in many respects an
exercise in time-consuming, expensive futility which was particularly irritating
to scientists and engineers, who had little patience for the lawyers' role and the
legalistic aspects of these proceedings."
These considerations led to further amendments to the 1954 Act in 1962.5"
Under these amendments the requirement for a mandatory hearing remained,
but only at the construction permit stage." No longer is there a requirement
for a hearing on issuance of an operating license or on issuance of amendments
to a permit or license. The AEC is, however, required to give thirty days notice
of its intent to issue an operating license or an amendment, and it must grant
a hearing at the request of any intervenor whose interest may be affected." The
Commission may dispense with the thirty days notice of intention to issue an
amendment to a permit or license if it determines that the amendment involves
"'no significant hazards consideration."'"
The 1962 amendments also added to the Act a new section that creates
one or more Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards to conduct hearings and
render intermediate or final decisions.5" Each such board is required by the
statute to consist of three members, "two of whom shall be technically qualified
and one of whom shall be qualified in the conduct of administrative proceedings."' 5
It is apparent from the foregoing that the basic consideration of the safety
of power reactors occurs at the construction permit stage. Issuance of the construction permit means that the reactor can be constructed at the specified
location. That much is settled and cannot be undone, and the permittee will
proceed with a very substantial investment in construction. Moreover, issuance
of the permit signifies that the AEC is satisfied that the reactor can be operated
safely at this location after construction is completed. The only questions left
relate to the technical details of particular components, equipment, and procedures. Thus, the issuance of a construction permit essentially means that a
decision has been made that a power reactor of a specified size and capacity
will almost certainly come into operation at that location.
It is useful, therefore, to focus specifically on the decision-making process
that results in issuance of the construction permit. The basic question presented
is whether the license application establishes that the reactor can be safely
operated. This question is dealt with primarily in the applicant's "safety analysis
report" which analyzes the proposed facility and the proposed operating pro53

The problems in the regulatory process were thoroughly discussed in STAFF OF
ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 87th Cong., Ist Sess., VIEWS AND COMMENTS ON IMPROVING THE AEC REGULATORY PROCESS (Joint Comm. Print, 1961), and in Hearings on
AEC Regulatory Problems Before the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1962). See also BERMAN AND HYDEMAN, supra note 50.
54 42 U.S.C. § 2239(a) (1964).
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 42 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (1964).
59 Id.
JOINT COMM.
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cedures in detail from the standpoint of safety considerations. The report includes
a discussion of the "maximum credible accident" that could occur, the manner
in which such an accident would be handled by equipment and personnel, and
its potential consequences. The applicant's task is to demonstrate, taking into
account the specific characteristics of the facility and its location (including
demographic, land use, meteorological, hydrological, and geological considerations), that no credible accident, including the maximum credible accident,
would result in releasing radioactive material into the environment in excess of
limits established in the AEC's radiation protection regulations.6
These questions are considered by a three-man Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, consisting of two technically qualified persons and one lawyer, drawn
from a panel of technically and legally qualified persons established for this purpose by the AEC. The present panel consists of 26 persons with a permanent
chairman, a lawyer, and vice-chairman, a technical person, both of whom are
full-time AEC employees. Two of the other lawyers on the panel are AEC
hearing examiners, two are practicing lawyers, and one is a law teacher. The
remaining members are technical people drawn from the AEC's national laboratories, universities, and industry."'
At the commencement of the proceeding, the board has before it a voluminous record consisting of the license application and amendments, correspondence between the AEC's regulatory staff and the applicant, the AEC staff's
safety analysis, and the ACRS report.62 The ACRS report is typically in the
form of a terse letter addressed to the chairman of the Commission. This report
does not discuss the proposed facility in detail, but discusses only those features
that the ACRS regards as of interest or significance. It frequently suggests the
need for additional research and development, changes in design, and careful
review of particular matters by the AEC regulatory staff, and calls upon the
applicant to provide further information from time to time. The final paragraph
typically expresses the Committee's judgment that all outstanding issues can
be resolved during construction and that there is reasonable assurance that the reactor can ultimately be operated without undue risk to the health and safety of the

60 Although the use of the provisional construction permit is justified on the basis that
additional technical information about details of the facility is still being developed through
research and experimentation, provisional permits will be issued notwithstanding incomplete
information about the physical characteristics of the site. For example, the Atomic Safety
and Licensing Board approved issuance of a provisional construction permit for the Millstone
Nuclear Power Station in Connecticut in 1966 despite the board's finding that the meteorology
of the site has not yet been established but that appropriate measurements of meteorological
parameters will be made at the site during construction. 2 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. f 11,255
(1966).
61 For the composition of the Panel, see 1 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. 403.
62 The AEC has published as Appendix A to its Rules of Practice a Statement of General Policy: Conduct of Proceedingsfor the Issuance of Construction Permits For Production

and Utilization FacilitiesFor Which a Hearing is Required Under Section 18 9a of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954 as Amended "for the information of public and assistance of members
of boards and parties to licensing proceedings." 31 Fed. Reg. 12774, 12777
(1966), as
amended, 31 Fed. Reg. 16309, 16310 (1966); 3 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. 1 14,1 4 4y, at 20,070
(1967). This statement states that board members should, prior to the hearing, review and
become familiar with the ACRS report, the AEC staff safety analysis, and the license application. 3 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. If 14,144y, at 20,072 (1967).
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public. In one or two instances, however, individual members of the ACRS
have stated separate views.63
A second major report on safety considerations is the report of the AEC's
regulatory staff. The staff analyzes safety problems simultaneously with the
ACRS review, and its report is usually made public, along with the ACRS
report, prior to the hearing. Unlike the ACRS report, the staff report is detailed
and comprehensive and discusses all significant aspects of the site and the facility.
The report characteristically concludes with a judgment that safety standards
are met and a recommendation that the construction permit be issued.
In actual practice, consideration by the ACRS and the AEC regulatory
staff has not, except in two instances, resulted in adverse reports.64 These groups
generally refrain from submitting their reports until all safety considerations
have been resolved to their satisfaction. Accordingly, hearings usually take place
only after the prestige of the ACRS is in support of issuance of the permit and
the AEC regulatory staff is committed to the position that safety standards have
been met. If either of these groups is not satisfied, the applicant will in all likelihood withdraw its application."
The precise nature of the hearing and the role of the Atomic Safety and
Licensing Board depend upon whether the hearing is contested or uncontested.
If there is no contest, the hearing usually involves only the presentation of testimony (typically in narrative written form, but subject to cross-examination)
by representatives of the applicant and the AEC regulatory staff. The board,
however, does not conduct a de novo evaluation of the evidence. Rather, its
role under the AEC's Rules of Practice is merely to determine whether the application and the record contain "sufficient information" and whether the regulatory
staff's review has been adequate to support the findings that must be made for
issuance of the construction permit.66 In contested cases, evidence is presented
by representatives of the applicant, the AEC regulatory staff, and by witnesses
called by the intervenors. The AEG's rules encourage written narrative testi63 See, for example, the separate statement by ACRS member Abel Wolman in the ACRS
report on the NASA Test Reactor. 2 CCH AT. EN. L. REP.
11,213, at 14,243-44 (1966).
64 Hearings, supra note 32, at 77-79. In the PRDC case, the ACRS submitted an adverse
report on the application for the construction permit, although its report actually expressed
no judgment on the ultimate question of reasonable assurance of no undue risk. In the
second case, the application of Pacific Gas & Electric for a construction permit to build a
reactor at Bodega Head about 1000 feet from a major earthquake fault zone, the ACRS
concluded that the applicant's engineering principles and general design afford that degree
of assurance required for protection of the reactor in the unlikely event of the predicted
maximum earthquake. Accordingly, it found reasonable assurance that the reactor could
be operated after construction "without undue hazard." CCH AT. EN. L. REP. 1 10,131, at
16,269 (Tr. binder). The AEC regulatory staff, however, in its report of October 26, 1964,
concluded that the site was not suitable and that a large power reactor should not be the
subject of a "pioneering construction effort based on unverified engineering principles, however sound they may appear to be." Id. The applicant then withdrew its application in the
face of the AEC staff report.
65 For example, the Public Service Electric and Gas Company of New Jersey withdrew
its application for a construction permit when members of the AEC staff and the ACRS
visited the site of the proposed plant near Burlington, New Jersey on August 11, 1967 and
informally stated that they "would have great difficulty in approving the Burlington site for
a nuclear power plant at this time" because of the area's population density. NUCLEAR INDUSTRY, Aug. 1967, at 8 (Atomic Industrial Forum publication).
66 10 C.F.R. § 2.104(b) (2) (1968); 3 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. I 14,144y, at 20,070 (1967).
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mony6 In these proceedings, the board is required to evaluate the evidence
de novo with respect to the matters that are in controversy. 8
It is worth noting that in performing its role the board does more than
merely weigh the evidence incorporated in the cold record of the proceeding."9
The Atomic Safety and Licensing Boards were explicitly created, with two
technically qualified members of "recognized caliber and stature in the nuclear
field," to "facilitate safety determinations and further enhance public confidence"
by bringing to bear their "technical expertise in the resolution of the difficult
scientific and technical problems associated with atomic energy licensing." 7
Clearly, therefore, the boards do not base their determinations solely upon the
evidence within the four comers of the record. The evidence is weighed and
assessed in terms of the knowledge, experience, and biases of the expert members
of the board.7' Moreover, the hearing procedures themselves have been significantly de-judicialized on the theory that "trial-type" proceedings are not
appropriate for the development of scientific and technical information concerning safety and also to accommodate the procedures to the temperaments
of the scientists and engineers who testify and sit on the boards.72
Under the Commission's rules, the boards render "initial decisions" which
become effective and constitute final action of the Commission in 45 days unless
a party files exceptions or the Commission on its own initiative requests that
the record be certified to it for final decision." In such cases, the final decision
is made by the five-man Commission."'
IV. Adequacy of the Licensing Procedures
In his dissent in the Power Reactor Development Company case, Mr.
Justice Douglas characterized nuclear power as involving "the most awesome,
the most deadly, the most dangerous process that man has ever conceived." 5
We have become accustomed to living in a society in which enormous hazards
are present. There are some hazards that we voluntarily assume, thereby subjecting ourselves to the risks, as when we cross a busy street, ride in an automobile or airplane, or drive across a bridge. There are other hazards that we
do not voluntarily and knowingly assume, but to which we are necessarily subject as a price of living in our modem technological society. Aircraft can fall
from the skies onto our residences, and accidents to railway or highway shipments of chemicals may result in widespread destruction and injury that may
affect any of us. Man's capacity for self-destruction through creation of new
67

10 C.F.R. § 2.743(b) (1968).

68 See note 62 supra; 3 COH AT. EN. L. REP. I 14 ,144 y, at 20,079-80 (1967).
69 H.R. pP. No. 1966, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962).
70 Id. at 9.
71 See note 62 supra; 3 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. f 14 ,144y, at 20,080 (1967). The AEC's
Rules of Practice explicitly state that with respect to matters in controversy the board "may
be called upon to make technical judgments of its own." Id. at 20,080.
72 In reporting out the legislation culminating in the 1962 amendments, the JCAE called
upon the AEG to adopt "informal procedures" appropriate to the resolution of complicated
scientific and technical questions. H.R. REP. No. 1966, supra note 69, at 6.
73 10 C.F.R. § 2.760 (1968).
74 10 C.F.R. § 2.770 (1968).
75 Power Reactor Dev. Co. v. International Union, 367 U.S. 396, 419 (1961).
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technology, even nonmilitary technology, is increasing at an exponential rate.
At some stage society must strike a balance between the magnitude of risk it is
prepared to accept and the utility and benefits to be gained from these riskproducing technologies.
How adequately do the procedures for licensing nuclear power reactors
strike this balance? Mr. Justice Douglas' view of the risks of nuclear power
is cast in the hyperbole of the layman. A more balanced and authoritative
statement comes from the testimony of Dr. Clifford K. Beck, Deputy Director
of Regulation of the Atomic Energy Commission, before the Joint Committee
on Atomic Energy in April, 1967:
[We must constantly keep in mind that the possibility of a serious accident
is finite, and, though the probability of such an accident is exceedingly low
and the record thus far is good, our vigilance must be maintained and our
efforts extended in behalf of safety. From our best evaluation of the overall
situation, of design, construction and protection systems for present reactors,
we believe that the small risk that exists does not represent an undue hazard
to the health and safety of the public."'
Dr. Beck says in effect that there is an exceedingly small risk of a serious nuclear
accident that could result in enormous damage to the public. This small risk,
he says, does not constitute an undue hazard to the health and safety of the
public. He, the AEC, and the JCAE, which has maintained continuing surveillance of the nuclear power program, have made the decision that there is
no undue hazard. What is an undue hazard? Presumably the hazard is not
undue because it has been balanced against, and found less weighty than, the
benefits of nuclear power. 7 But the balancing process has been performed by
those very public bodies that are pledged to accelerate the development of nuclear
power and whose performance as public servants will be measured, at least irr
the short run (until there is a nuclear catastrophe), by the number of kilowatts
of nuclear power being produced in the United States.
Realistically, what are the hazards of nuclear power? It is said that normal
operation of a reactor in accordance with AEC regulations poses no risks to the
health and safety of the public.7
This statement is true, but requires some
qualification. The very existence of a nuclear power plant gives rise to the
creation of additional radioactive materials. Nuclear fuel elements must be
manufactured and transported to the reactor. Operation of the reactor produces radiation and highly radioactive materials. Some radioactive effluents
are discharged, in a carefully controlled manner, into the environment. In due
course fuel elements containing highly dangerous radioactive materials must be
removed from the reactor and transported for reprocessing. The highly toxic
radioactive wastes must be disposed of. Inevitably at every stage of this process
76 Hearings on Licensing and Regulation of Nuclear Reactors Before the Joint Comm.
on Atomic Energy, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 67 (1967).
77 This balancing operation is explicit in the AEC staff safety analysis in the Bodega Head
reactor case, where the staff addressed itself to the question whether "the public benefits to be
gained" from operation of the plant "are high enough to justify acceptance of the added
uncertainties." See note 64 supra.
78 See ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, YOUR BODY AND RADIATION 31 (1966).
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members of the public will be exposed to more radiation, albeit infinitesimal
in the absence of a mishap, than would otherwise be the case. We are told that
such exposure involves no hazards to the public because it does not result in
exposures in excess of those permissible under the AEC's radiation protection
standards."' The fact of the matter is, however, that even these standards represent a balancing of risks against hazards. They are bottomed on the absence
of evidence that such low exposures are harmful and not on knowledge that
this is the case. Very little is known about the long-term somatic effects of sustained exposure to even very low degrees of radiation, but it is generally believed
that any exposure to radiation, however small, has adverse genetic effects and
that these effects are cumulative."0 These considerations have led to the basic
principle that "There should not be any man-made radiation exposure without
the expectation of benefit resulting from such exposure.""' To the extent that
people in the vicinity of a reactor are being exposed to these very low levels of
radiation, it is assumed that such risks as exist are outweighed by the benefits
-not
directly to the persons exposed, but to the public as a whole because we
need nuclear power. Thus, the public assumes whatever risks may exist, just
as it pays taxes, to support a national program. However, the entire licensing
structure is based on the premise that effective and vigilant AE
regulation
makes the risk of a major accident exceedingly low. Significantly, however, the
public is asked to assume a risk that the nuclear industry is not prepared to
assume itself.
Shortly after the 1954 Act opened the nuclear power industry to private
enterprise, it became apparent that the problem of potential liability to the
public was a substantial roadblock to investment of private funds in nuclear
power projects. The insurance industry, with virtually no experience in assessing
nuclear risks, was unprepared and unwilling to write third party liability insurance contracts against the astronomically high potential liability that could
result in event of an accident. In addition, the very size of the potential liability
was in itself beyond the capacity of the insurance industry. 2 Faced with the
inability to acquire adequate insurance protection, the utilities and the nuclear
equipment manufacturers served notice that they were unwilling to proceed
with nuclear power development, which could result in bankrupting public
liability claims in event of an accident, unless some mechanism were found to
provide adequate financial protection."3 Both the AEC and the JCAE then
79 BERMAN AND HYDEMAN, supra note 50, at 21.
80 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, NATIONAL

ACADEMY
LOGICAL EFFECTS OF ATOMIC RADIATION (summary reports 1956).
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81 Federal Radiation Council, Memorandum for the President on Radiation Protection
Guidance for Federal Agencies, in 1 CCH AT. EN. L. REP. f 4046, at 9115 (May 13, 1960).
82 A 1963 study reported that, aside from the atomic energy experience, "[e]ven the
largest companies in the country generally can obtain at most $30,000,000 or $35,000,000
worth of liability insurance. The market for the upper portions of this coverage appears to
be thin, with continued availability at tolerable cost uncertain." ROSENTHAL, KORN & LUBMAN, CATASTROPHIC ACCIDENTS IN, GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS 58-59 (1963).
83 General Electric Company, probably the most important manufacturer of nuclear
equipment at the time, stated in effect that it would withdraw from participation in development of nuclear power unless federal legislation produced a solution to the public liability
problem. Hearings on Governmental Indemnity and Reactor Safety Before the Joint Comm.
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undertook consideration of a program for government underwriting of these
risks.
Their consideration resulted in enactment in 1957 of an amendment to the
1954 Act commonly referred to as the Price-Anderson Act. 4 This legislation
rested on two justifications: first, that industry, on which reliance was placed
for development of nuclear power, should be protected against potential bankrupting liability, thereby enabling industry to proceed with development of the
technology;8" and, second, that assurance should be provided that in the event
of a serious accident funds would be available to compensate the injured public
for its losses.86 The principal features of the Act are as follows: (1) The AEG
requires each licensee, as a condition of his power reactor license, to carry "financial protection" equal in amount to the maximum available from private
sources.
Since by this time the insurance industry was prepared to offer 60
million dollars in public liability coverage, the effect of this was to require
utilities to carry insurance in that amount.88 (2) On top of this private insurance,
the AEC enters into contracts with licensees indemnifying them against public
liability claims to the extent of an additional 500 million dollars.8 " This indemnity extends not only to the licensee, but also to any other person who might
be liable as a result of a "nuclear incident" at the licensed facility."0 Thus, not
only are equipment manufacturers and suppliers protected by the indemnity,
but the indemnity extends as well, to cite an example given in the JCAE report
on the bill," to persons negligently maintaining an airplane motor causing the
plane to crash into a reactor plant resulting in injury to the public. (3) To the
extent that public liability arising out of any nuclear incident exceeds the sum
of the required financial protection plus the 500 million dollar indemnity, all
liability would be cut off at this point 2 and payment of the claims would be
apportioned by a District Court in the manner of a bankruptcy proceeding. 9
(4) The 1957 Price-Anderson Act had nothing to say about determination of
liability. Whether or not liability existed in any case was to be determined
94
under applicable state law.
on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 148 (1957).
Significantly this "roadblock"
was not a matter of public discussion until almost immediately after the 1954 Act became
law. See Green, Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEo. WASH. L. REV.
121, 140-42 (1964).
84 71 Stat. 576-79 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1964).
85 H.R. RaP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1957).
86 Id. at 9.
87 42 U.S.C. § 2210(b) (1964).
88 As of January 1, 1966, the insurance industry increased its coverage to $74 million
per facility with an indication that the maximum would be increased in stages to $100 million
by 1975. EXTENDING AND AMENDING THE PRIcE-ANDERSON INDEMNITY PROVISIONS OF THE
ATOMIC ENERGY AcT OF 1954 AS AMENDED, H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 11
(1965).
89 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1967). Under the 1965 amendment, the $500 million indemnity is reduced by the amount that the financial protection required by AEC (now $74
million) exceeds $60 million. Thus, the AEC indemnity today stands at $486 million.
90 42 U.S.C. § 2210(c) (1964).
91 H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1957).
92 71 Stat. 576 (1957), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1964).
93 71 Stat. 576 (1957). For the current provisions, reflecting a 1966 amendment, see
42 U.S.C. § 2210(o) (Supp. II 1966).
94 H.R. REP. No. 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957). For changes made by the 1966
amendments, see text accompanying note 101 infra.
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The provisions of the Price-Anderson Act were to be effective for a tenyear period and applicable to any facility for which a construction permit was
issued prior to August 1, 1967.11 The hope was that by 1967 "there will be
enough experience gained so that the problems of reactor safety will be to a
great extent solved and the insurance people will have had experience on which
to base a sound program of their own."" This hope did not materialize, and in
1965 the Act was extended for an additional ten-year period.17 It was the conclusion of the JCAE that the "potential threat of uninsurable liability . . .
based as it is on a lack of sufficient operating experience to form an adequate
judgment of risk" was as great a deterrent to industrial participation in 1965 as
it was in 1957.1' Despite the JCAE's assurances that "expert opinion holds this
indemnity almost certainly will never be utilized,"" there apparently existed

sufficient uncertainty as to warrant additional amendments in 19660 designed
to facilitate payment of claims in the event of a "nuclear incident" which the
AEC characterizes as an "extraordinary nuclear occurrence" -one that has
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons and property
offsite. Under the 1966 amendments, the AEC's indemnity agreements and private insurance contracts will contain provisions that, with respect to any "extraordinary nuclear occurrences," the persons indemnified waive: (1) Any issue or
defense as to fault of the person indemnified and contributory negligence or
assumption of risk by the claimant; (2) any issue or defense as to charitable or
governmental immunity, and (3) any issue or defense based on the statute of
limitations if suit is initiated within three years from the date on which the claimant first knew, or reasonably could have known, of his injury and its cause, but in
no event more than ten years after the date of the nuclear incident. 1 '
Thus, although the licensing of nuclear reactors proceeds on the assumption
that there are no undue hazards to the public, the Price-Anderson Act is bottomed on the premise that operation of a nuclear reactor involves undue risk
to industry. The public assumes the very same risk of a serious accident that
the utilities and equipment manufacturers are unwilling to assume and against
which they are indemnified by the Government. The only sop thrown to the
public is some assurance that funds will be available to provide compensation
for damages incurred if liability can be established. At the same time the AEG
and the JCAE contend that there is only an infinitesimal likelihood that the
Price-Anderson indemnity will ever be used, they devote countless hours and
untold energy in making the elaborate Price-Anderson Act even more elaborate
with exquisite new devices to enhance financial protection of the public.
V. Experience v. Prediction
In earlier times -

indeed only a quarter of a century ago -

before the

Government became committed to forcing technological advance through mas95
96
97

71 Stat. 576 (1957).
H.R. REP. No 435, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1957).
79 Stat. 855 (1965).

98 H.R. Rap. No. 883, supra note 88, at 9 (emphasis added).
99
100
101

Id. at 8.
42 U.S.C. § 2210(n) (Supp. 1967).
Id.
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sive support of scientific research and development, technological advance occurred in micro-steps, but yet surely. Hardheaded businessmen assessed new
ideas against the background of technological experience and scientific knowledge
to determine if it was worthwhile and potentially profitable to invest money in
a new development. They considered not only potential revenues, but also
potential costs, including potential public liability or the expense of insurance
against such liability."' 2 The insurance industry itself played a major role in
technology assessment. Insurance usually was available, at least at reasonable
rates, only where experience permitted a realistic assessment of risk. The availability and costs of insurance operated as a red light to deter technological
advance or as a green light to accelerate it, depending on the factor of experience.
Each successive step in technological advance was absorbed before further major
steps were taken.1 ' The forces of the market place operated to provide, in themselves, some protection of the public interest against major technological hazards.1" 4 But, as is well known, these forces have not always been adequate, and
not infrequently government has been forced to step in to provide affirmative
regulation. Typically, and in its pure form, government regulation of technological hazards has been single-minded. Although in most cases the hazards
involved cannot be reduced to zero consistent with continuation of the regulated
activity, the primary function of the regulatory authority is to protect the public
interest. Characteristically, public regulation of activities affecting the public
safety in a manner analogous to the effect of nuclear power has been based on
experience. Where technology is regulated, the regulation typically requires more
than a showing that a proposed activity has not been demonstrated to be hazardous; rather, there must be a convincing demonstration that it is safe.'
102 A principal objective of tort law and the imposition of liability upon an enterprise
whose activities cause injury to members of the public has been to discourage that enterprise
from engaging in activities in which major risks of danger are inherent. See James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered: The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549, 557 (1948).
103 It has been pointed out that high pressure steam boiler technology has advanced from
1916 when maximum temperatures were 6500 F. and maximum pressures were 350 pounds
per square inch to 1963 when maximum temperatures were 12000 F. and maximum pressures
were 5000 pounds per square inch. This advancement occurred on a step-by-step basis
"through a remarkable system of cooperation between mechanical engineers, boiler manufacturers, and insurance underwriters. As new metalurgy [sic] and welding techniques, along
with more effective inspection and testing were developed from year to year, the cumulative
record of safe performance of the thousands of boilers throughout the country gave the insurance underwriters a continuing basis for writing 100 percent insurance coverage." Testimony
of Adolph J. Ackerman, Hearings on Proposed Extension of AEC Indemnity Legislation
Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 89th Cong., 1st
Sess. 289 (1965).
104 One effect of the Price-Anderson Act has been to undermine the role of the market
forces and particularly to minimize the function of potential liability as a deterrent to inherently
hazardous activities. The premiums paid by utilities for private liability insurance on their
nuclear power plants are individually rated by the insurance underwriters and presumably
reflect the risk. In 1964, for example, Commonwealth Edison's premium for $60 million
insurance on its Dresden plant was $233,000. On the other hand, the AEC's fee for the
$500 million indemnity was only $21,000. Hearings, supra note 103, at 9. The AEC's
indemnity fees are acknowledged to be "much lower than the charge which would be assessed
for 'commercial' insurance if such insurance were available." H.R. REP. No. 883, supra note
88, at 8.
105 For example, under the Chemical Food Additive Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 1784 (1958),
and regulations promulgated thereunder by the Food and Drug Administration, chemical
food additives may not be used unless it is demonstrated by an applicant, based on adequate
animal tests, that the additive will be safe for its intended use. The basic standard is that
additives for use by man will not be deemed safe if they exceed 1/100th of the maximum
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The nuclear power program is a prime example of a different approach to
technological advance. Although nuclear power is primarily a commercial thing,
a judgment has been made that national policy demands the rapid development
of the technology. To this end, the Government has made substantial direct and
indirect monetary and other contributions to development of the technology,
and it has taken affirmative action to remove the deterrent effect of potential
liability. The effect of this has been to compress into a few years technological
advance that otherwise might have required a century or more of effort. Successively larger and more sophisticated generations of power reactors are being
licensed and constructed before we have the benefit of experience with the earlier
generations.' 08
The crucial question is whether the AEC regulatory process is adequate to
protect the public interest against the enormous potential consequences of this
technology. Can we be confident that, given the AEC regulatory program, the
risk of serious accident is indeed exceedingly low? In seeking an answer, we
should recognize at the outset that the regulatory program is administered by the
very same agency that is responsible for, committed to, and under very great
political pressures to speed development of nuclear power. Although the licensing
and regulatory activities of the AEC are totally separated from the AEC's
operational and promotional functions below the level of the Commission itself,
the five-man Commission is responsible equally for both phases of the overall
atomic energy program. The possibility of splitting the Atomic Energy Commission into separate agencies with a separate and independent agency to conduct
the regulatory and licensing program has been considered and rejected."0 7 A
principal basis for this rejection has been that such a new regulatory agency
might become preoccupied by safety considerations and not give adquate recognition to the need for pioneering the diverse peaceful uses of atomic energy,
thus creating the possibility of "policy deadlocks" between the new agency and
the AEC.'
Implicit in this policy justification is the premise that licensing
and regulatory actions should reflect the need for pioneering. Putting this another
way, it seems to be national policy that the regulatory program should not be
single-mindedly safety oriented, but that some risks should be tolerated for the
sake of rapid technological advance.
Thus, it is clear that the reactor licensing program is presently conducted
with some degree of bias in the direction of technological advance. Even aside
from such inherent bias in the institutional structure, there are other factors that
cause concern. As has been pointed out, the entire national nuclear power
program is based on the principle of bypassing experience. We proceed with
larger and newer reactor projects without adequate feedback from former
projects. For the lessons of experience we substitute thorough and meticulous
amount demonstrated to be without harm to experimental animals. 21 C.F.R. §§ 121.5-.51

(1966).

106 At this point it is useful to recall the .TCAE's statement that there is "a lack of sufficient operating experience to form an adequate judgment of risk." H.R. REP. No. 883,
supra note 88, at 9.
107 STAFF OF JOINT CoMM. ON ATomIc ENERGY, 87TH: CONG., 1ST SESS., VMWS AND
COMMENTS ON IMPROVING THE ABC REGULATORY PROCESS 65 (Joint Comm. Print 1961).
108 Id.
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study of the problems by outstanding, and presumably independent and objective, experts.
This brings us face to face with the reality that the assumption that the
risks of a major accident are very small rests on the underlying assumption of
the infallibility of the experts' judgments and predictions. Although we may
take comfort from the record to date, this is a slim reed on which to base adequate protection of the health and safety of the public against the consequences
of a nuclear catastrophe. There are countless examples of the most carefully
engineered artifacts, reviewed and approved by safety-conscious governmental
authorities, that have gone bad with disastrous consequences." °9 Moreover, no
degree of governmental regulation and meticulous engineering can guard against
human fallibility or idiocy in operating and maintaining a reactor. In 1961,
a severe nuclear excursion occurred in a small reactor operated by military
personnel at the AEC's National Reactor Testing Station in Idaho. Although
the public was not affected by the accident,11 three of the operating personnel
were killed and many others received significant radiation exposure in excess of
permissible limits. An AEC board of investigation was unable to identify the
cause of the accident other than to conjecture that the "most likely immediate
cause" involved "some unusually rapid and extensive motion of the central control rod," possibly by operating personnel who had been thoroughly trained in
"
' In another incident, the Fermi reactor experienced an
the correct procedure. 11
accident in October, 1966 that involved some meltdown of the core, the type
of accident that had been characterized in PRDC's safety analysis as "incredible."
Fortunately, no injuries resulted. PRDC, the operator of the reactor, eventually
reported its "positive" determination that the accident was caused by a piece
of construction debris, i.e., a piece of sheet metal left behind in the reactor during
construction. Subsequently it was learned that this explanation was not accurate, but that a piece of zirconium sheet metal that had been hurriedly bolted
to a primary system component as a cover had broken loose. More dramatically, it
was revealed that the zirconium cover was designed and used without recording
its use in the construction drawings and, therefore, in a manner concealing its
use from the knowledge and approval of the AEC. A PRDC spokesman is

109 Only a few need be mentioned: the Northeast power blackout, the Lockheed Electra,
and the Apollo spacecraft fire.
110 The AEC did, however, consider what the consequences of the accident might have
been if the reactor had been located in a populated area. It was concluded that it was
unlikely that any member of the public "would have unavoidably received a radiation dose
larger than he would be permitted on an annual basis under current standards of radiation
protection." Some countermeasures might have been necessary to limit exposure to radiation
directly from the reactor or from foods produced in the immediate area. "It is likely that
the biological effects . . . would be much less important than other affects such as emotional
7
stress, inconvenience, and economic loss." STAFF OF JOINT COMm. ON ATOMIC ENERGY, 8 TH
CONG., IST. SEss.,
REPORT 109 (Joint
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Comm. Print 1961).
111 Id. at 38. The board also concluded, however, that the pre-accident condition of the
reactor core and reactor control system "had deteriorated to such an extent that a prudent
operator would not have allowed operation of the reactor to continue without a thorough
analysis and review, and subsequent corrective action, with respect to the possible consequences
or hazards resulting from the known deficiencies." Id. at v-vi. This was a reactor for which
the AEC itself had direct operational responsibility.
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reported to have stated that this was "inexcusable," but that such practices
were not uncommon in the nuclear industry 2
Thus, even assuming the most single-minded safety regulation by the AEC,
these examples illustrate that serious accidents can and will occur because of
human error and cost-cutting shortcuts by industry. But the assumption of singleminded safety regulation bears still further scrutiny. We have already seen that
the locus of regulation within the ABC creates some bias in favor of technological advance and getting more power reactors in operation faster. We have
noted, moreover, that the basic decisions in reactor licensing involve a large
measure of prediction based on factors other than operating experience. We are
told by the nuclear industry that "Those who are concerned about the safety of
atomic power but have nothing specific on which to base their reservations
often say: 'Well, engineers are human, and human beings make mistakes .... ,,'13 Conceding this to be true, the industry spokesmen say that this
is why the AEC "has built so elaborate a system of checks and balances into its
licensing and regulatory procedure" citing the roles of the AEC regulatory
staff, the ACRS, the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, and the AEC's Division
of Compliance14
It cannot be denied that the AEC's regulatory procedures provide for exhaustive multiple reviews by several bodies. The critical question, answerable
only in the light of long-run experience, is whether or not any of these bodies,
or all of them in combination, have the temperament and competence to make
meaningful and acceptable judgments as to what degree of risk constitutes an
"undue risk." Such judgments involve not only the abstract question of how
effective the engineered safeguards may be, but also the balancing of the benefits
of nuclear power against the potential social costs involved in whatever risks
the public in fact must accept. This is an exercise that requires the skills and
instincts of social scientists, humanists, lawyers, and others, as well as those of
the scientists and engineers who presently hold a near monopoly on the decisionmaking process. Moreover, despite the statutory provisions for licensing reactors
"in a goldfish bowl" with public hearings and public disclosure of safety analyses,
in actual practice the regulatory procedures tend to stifle public awareness and
discussion of the safety issues.
These deficiencies exist even though the AEC regulatory program is probably the most thoroughly studied and analyzed of any in the nation's history.
112 NUCLEAR INDusTRY, Feb. 1968, at 17-19 (Atomic Industrial Forum publication);
Hearings on AEC Authorizing Legislation Fiscal Year 1969 Before the joint Comm. on Atomic
Energy, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 110, 219-21 (1968). Congressman Holifield characterized use
of the zirconium shield as "Bandaid technology." Id. at 221. The decision to use the shield

was apparently based on the belief that "it would be easier to put the zirc shrouds over the
cone than to have to justify not doing so to the ACRS when it came time for an operating
license." Id. at 219. The Director of the AEC's Division of Reactor Development and
Technology stated:
This is again characteristic of the problems associated with building things.
When one is under a tight budgetary situation, people don't feel it is important to

document things. They frequently pass documentation up in favor of doing other

113

things. This is characteristic of almost any engineering business. Id. at 220.
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Almost every year the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy holds extensive hearings on the regulatory and licensing program, and the ABC itself has engaged
in very considerable introspection. But the thrust of such analysis in recent years
has been primarily to consider ways in which-the licensing program can be
streamlined to facilitate faster licensing decisions and to accommodate the present
and coming flood of nuclear power plant license applications.
In January, 1965, the ABC appointed a seven-man Regulatory Review
Panel "from outside the government" to review the Commission's policies and
procedures for licensing nuclear reactors.' 15 One would expect that most of the
members of such a panel would be lawyers, but the panel included only one
lawyer, its chairman, who was formerly the AEC's general counsel. The other
six members can best be described as scientists, engineers, and executives of various firms in the nuclear industry. The Panel identified four major problems
in the reactor licensing process: (1) the length of the process, (2) the absence of
definite requirements and criteria, (3) the increase in regulatory manpower requirements, and (4) the multiplicity of technical reviews. 1 6 It strongly expressed confidence that the regulatory process then in being protected the public
interest:
All effort which could be reasonably expected is being exerted to
insure that there is no undue hazard to the public health and safety while
at the same time no crippling obstacle is placed in the way of the development of an industry involving highly technical and complex new technology. 117 _(Emphasis added.)
Implicit, at least, in the Panel's conclusions was the proposition that public
hearings are mere window dressing and that the actual decision to license a
reactor is made (behind closed doors and beyond public scrutiny) by the ACRS
and the AEC's regulatory staff, primarily the latter. It characterized the most
significant functions of the public hearings as being: (1) to give the public a
"firsthand impression of the applicant's character and competence;" (2) to
show the public that "the AEC has been diligent in protecting the public's
interest" and that the AEG staff and the ACRS staff "have only the public's
interest in mind;" (3) to give the public a "convincing demonstration" that
there has been a "thorough and competent review" of the applicant's proposal;
(4) to develop a factual record in public; and (5) to provide the public with
a "forum for recording its views, both pro and con, on the applicant's proposal.""'
One of the Panel's recommendations was that every effort be made
to suppress and conceal from the public differences of opinion between the
ACRS and the AEC's regulatory staff. It recommended that in the event it
appears that these two groups are likely to reach "different conclusions or make
divergent recommendations," they should hold joint meetings "and make every
115
REP.
116
1965,
117
118

Atomic Energy Comm'n, Press Release No. H-17, Jan. 25, 1965; CCH AT. EN. L.
10,151 (Tr. binder).
Report to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Regulatory Review Panel, July 14,
at 5-9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 13.
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effort to reconcile differences" so that divergent reports would be made public
only if agreement cannot be reached." 9
The Panel's report was generally applauded by industry and the Commission,"' and the AEC's regulations were subsequently revised to implement
most of its recommendations.12 1
It is apparent that the basic licensing decisions are made by technical
specialists operating beyond effective public scrutiny. True, the license application, with its mass of complex scientific and engineering detail, is available for
public scrutiny and the public has the benefit of the safety analyses and conclusions of the ACRS and the AEC regulatory staff, but these come only after
all safety issues have been resolved to their satisfaction. Once their decisions are
made, there is no effective mechanism for probing the decisions reached and for
informing the public as to the elements of "due" or "undue" risk. In the entire
licensing process, the experts address themselves mainly to other experts in their
own scientific and technical jargon. The general public cannot be expected to
understand this jargon or its implications. Even when an intervention occurs,
an intervenor seeking to represent the public interest has immense obstacles
before him since he finds arrayed against him all of the resources of the entire
government and private nuclear establishment. He will have, at the threshold, great difficulty in finding experts to explain the technical situation to him,
let alone to testify in his behalf. Challenging the safety of the facility is at best
an enormously expensive undertaking.
If the public interest is adequately protected by the present procedures,
the protection is afforded behind dosed doors; the public must accept as an
article of faith that this is being done effectively and that the finding of "no

undue risk" means there is no risk that the public, if fully informed, would be
unwilling to accept. Once the case emerges into the light of day with the
blessings of the ACRS and the AEC regulatory staff, there is, in effect, a commitment on the part of the AEC to permit construction of the reactor. This is
manifest in the role of the AEC staff counsel at the hearings. As the Regulatory

Review Panel pointed out:
It has been the policy of the AEC staff counsel to limit cross-examination of the applicant to clarification of those matters which have not already
been resolved, with the one exception that cross-examination is normally
119 Id. at 25-26.
120 The Commission was "impressed with the depth of understanding by the Panel
of problems involved in the AEC reactor licensing program and the soundness of its
recommendations for future courses of action." Atomic Energy Comm'n, Press Release
No. H-f165, July 21, 1965; CCH AT. EN. L. RP.
10,207, at 16,360 (Tr. binder). Although
the charter of the Panel was comprehensive, and its report in no way limited its conclusions
and recommendations to uncontested cases, the AEC, on April 4, 1966, stated that the Panel's
recommendations "dealt largely with uncontested cases" and appointed a Second Regulatory
Review Panel to make an "in-depth study of contested cases." The second panel, consisting
of three members, was chaired by the former AEC general counsel who also had chaired the
first panel. The other members were another lawyer and a utility executive; the latter had
also served on the first panel. Atomic Energy Comm'n, Press Release No. J-86, April 4, 1966;
CCH AT. EN. L. RmP. g 10,273 (Tr. binder). For its conclusions and recommendations,
most of which have been implemented by the AEC, see Report to the Atomic Energy Commission by the Second Regulatory Review Panel, June 1967.
121 Testimony of AEC Commissioner James T. Ramey, Hearings, supra note 76, at 10.
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used to bring out the fact that minimal discharges of radioactive material
are to be expected from routine operations and to bring out some of the
plant safeguards in accident situations. 1 22 (Emphasis added.)
To put the matter more plainly, the role of the AEC staff counsel is to help the
applicant get the construction permit.
VI Conclusion
It may be safely assumed that the present national policy, as reflected in
the Atomic Energy Act and the JCAE's continuing acquiescent surveillance, is
that nuclear power technology be developed and practiced at a rapidly expanding
rate. The AEC regulatory program attempts to reconcile maintenance of the
health and safety of the public with this objective.
The risks are enormous, and one cannot blink away this fact by arguing that
the enormous risks attach only in the exceedingly remote possibility of a serious
accident - at least while the nuclear industry insists upon the protection of the
ever more elaborate financial safeguards of the Price-Anderson Act. Curiously,
the public as a whole has acquiesced in this national policy despite the enormous
risks. In part this is attributable to good public relations on the part of the
JCAE and the AEC which generally cooperate symbiotically to sugar-coat, play
down, and obscure the major public policy issues in all atomic energy policy decisions. 2' It is not surprising, in view of the public relations effort and the
esoteric nature of those aspects of nuclear safety that come to the public's attention, that even those who live and work in the long shadow of the destructive
capability of power reactors tend to be acquiescent.
The issue of reactor safety is an important one and becomes more vital as
we contemplate the operation of scores of power reactors from coast to coast,
each one with an operating life of many years in which hundreds of millions of
dollars have been invested. As former AEG Chairman Strauss stated in 1955,
"inevitably, as more and more reactors are built and used, familiarity will breed
some degree of contempt for the dangers."" Inevitably also, the utilities which
have pressed in the past for location of reactors in more highly populated areas
will press more strenuously, and it will be increasingly difficult for the AEC to
resist these pressures.
122 Report to the Atomic Energy Commission, supra note 116, at 41.
123 See Green, Nuclear Technology and the Fabric of Government, 33 GEo. WAsr. L.
Rav. 121 (1964). It should also be pointed out that the atomic energy establishment is quite
intolerant of dissent with respect to the premises underlying the licensing and regulatory
program. Its basic tactic is to deal with dissenters with a vigorous, and perhaps even somewhat ruthless, attack on their credibility- i.e., seeking to demonstrate that the dissenters
have little, or no experience in the nuclear field; that they cannot support their positions with
factual data; and that factual allegations made by them as part of their contentions are
incorrect or unsupportable. See, for example, the treatment given one dissenter in 1965.
Hearings, supra note 103, at 155-76. This phenomenon poses some interesting questions.
One would hope, of course, that dissent would be based on valid factual premises. On the
other hand, itisunfortunately the case that those with experience in the field and with a
solid command of the facts are unlikely to become dissenters since they have vested political
and economic interests in rapid development and practice of the technology.
124 Hearings on Development, Growth, and State of the Atomic Energy Industry Before
the Joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 59 (1955).
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Each reactor should be recognized as the immense potential risk it is.
It should be recognized that whether or not "undue risk" to the health and
safety of the public exists can never be a matter of all black or all white. Further,
it should be recognized that the degree of risk that the public is called upon
to assume is basically a function of the utility's economics. In many instances,
the risk can be reduced by selection of a more remote site. In every instance, the
risk can be reduced through incorporation of additional, though costly, engineering safeguards. 25 These considerations make it vitally important that questions
of reactor safety and risk be resolved in the clear light of day with all issues and
aspects made subject to intelligent comprehension by the public that is called
upon to assume the risk.

How can this be accomplished? Certainly the creation of a separate regulatory and licensing agency would be a forward step. This would provide some
assurance that public-spirited zeal to accelerate development and practice of
nuclear power technology would not detract from the paramount concern for
the health and safety of the public. But useful though this step would be, it is
not in itself adequate. What is required is a scheme that would require and
facilitate the public articulation, in language which the public can understand,
of the nature of the risks, the steps taken to minimize them, and the degree of
risk that remains. This would permit a meaningful balancing of costs against
benefits and the focusing of public attention on the policy questions.
One way to achieve this, even with the present organization of the AEC,
would be to invert the burden of proof. As has been previously shown, once a
construction permit proceeding emerges into the public arena with the imprimatur of the ACRS and the AEC regulatory staff affixed to the license application, the presumption is that the permit will be issued, and all official
efforts are exerted in behalf of issuance of the permit. Correspondingly, a heavy
burden rests on any member of the public who seeks to oppose issuance. Consideration of what the risks are, what has been done to minimize them, and
what risks remain is smothered and obscured from public vision. Given the
magnitude of the potential hazard and the fact that the applicant enjoys the
beneficence of the Price-Anderson Act, is it unreasonable to impose upon the
applicant a more substantial burden of proof in the public arena? Should not
the applicant be required to demonstrate convincingly and in public that there
is no "undue risk?"
125

The Committee [Advisory Committee on Reactor Safeguards] recognizes that

adding safety precautions involves some additional expense. It is concerned about
the heavy burden of cost which excessive safety protection may entail. The Committee is trying to find that level of protection which will result in adequate safeguards to the public without excessive cost. It believes that in this early stage of
the technology safeguards may be imposed which, in the future, may be found to
be unnecessary.
Testimony of Dr. C. Rogers McCullough, Hearings on Development, Growth, and State of
the Atomic Energy Industry Before the joint Comm. on Atomic Energy, 85th Cong., 2d Sess.
118 (1958). More recently, Dr. Chauncey Starr pointed out that "if we wanted to put containment on top of containment, we can make a nuclear plant meet any safety criterion." Remarks of Dr. Chauncey Starr, Safety and the Public- Responsibilities of the Atomic Community: A Panel Discussion, Proceedings of the 1963 Annual Meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum 131 (1964).
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Careful, thorough, and objective review of safety considerations by the
AEC regulatory staff is undoubtedly necessary, and the licensing authority,
presently the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, should have the benefit of
the staff's review as is now the case. But there is no reason why AEC staff
counsel, representing the public interest and aided by competent technical staff,
should not adopt the posture of representing the interest of the public health
and safety. Rather than exerting his efforts on behalf of the applicant as is
now done, he could very easily put the applicant to its proof through searching
cross-examination and by calling witnesses of his own to testify as to negative
factors. What is suggested is that the procedure requires a "devil's advocate."
Although such procedures may not in fact have great influence on whether or
not a construction permit or license is ultimately issued, they would serve to
educate the public. Such education would at the very least serve to inform the
public of the risks being assumed and provide a basis, if the public were unwilling to assume these risks, for legislative action.
This approach would undoubtedly slow the steam roller of technological
progress. It would undoubtedly make licensing procedures more difficult and
expensive for industry, and might even deter decisions to "go nuclear." But
why the hurry?

